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REAL AND NOMINAL WAGE ADJUSTMENT 





How are wages set in an open economy? What role is played by demand pressure, 
international competition, and structural factors in the labour market? How important is 
nominal wage rigidity and exchange rate policy for the evolution of real wages and 
competitiveness? To answer these questions, we formulate a theoretical model of wage 
bargaining in an open economy and use it to derive a simple wage equation where all 
parameters have clear economic interpretations. We estimate the wage equation on data for 
aggregate manufacturing wages in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden from the mid 
1960s to the mid 1990s. 
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1. Introduction 
Wage formation and competitiveness are important concerns in open economies and 
aggregate wage equations have been estimated for a long time in the Nordic countries. Most 
recent research on aggregate wage determination employs an error-correction approach, 
where a long run equilibrium condition is embedded in a statistical model of the dynamics.
1  
In such models, the long run equilibrium condition is usually a relation between the wage 
share and unemployment.  The basic idea is that when unemployment is high, workers can 
appropriate a smaller share of the cake.  
Such a specification appears reasonable and has had empirical success, but its 
relation to wage bargaining theory is somewhat unclear.  A close look reveals several 
inconsistencies between the standard theoretical bargaining model - as presented by e g 
Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991) – and the typical empirical wage equation.
2 First, the wage 
share is constant and independent of unemployment in the standard theoretical model. This 
makes it hard to see how we can rationalize an empirical specification where there is a long 
run relation between the wage share and unemployment. Second, a standard theoretical result 
is that the equilibrium wage is proportional to the unemployment benefit, with a “mark up” 
that depends on the level of unemployment, implying a unit elasticity of the wage with respect 
to the unemployment benefit (see Appendix 1). In empirically estimated wage equations, 
benefits play a much more modest role. Third, the standard union bargaining model allows 
only an indirect role for productivity in the wage equation. For a given level of 
unemployment, productivity affects wages only if it affects unemployment benefits or the 
value of leisure and home production.
3 Empirical models typically allow productivity to have 
a direct effect on wages. The same argument applies to foreign prices and exchange rates. 
Finally, most theoretical wage bargaining models are real and static models which say 
nothing about adjustment to shocks and leave no role for monetary (exchange rate) policy. 
Empirical error-correction models allow a general, data-based, dynamic structure, but with 
                                                           
1 See Nymoen (1989), Calmfors & Nymoen (1990), Rodseth and Holden (1990),  Johansen (1995), Forslund & 
Kolm (2004), Holden & Nymoen (2001), Nymoen & Rødseth (2003), Bårdsen, Eitrheim, Jansen & Nymoen 
(2005).  
2 In Appendix 1 we present a model where the “threat point” of the workers is the expected utility if a worker 
leaves the firm without a job, the production function has constant returns to scale, and capital can be rented at a 
given cost in the world market. Under these conditions, the equilibrium wage is proportional to the 
unemployment benefit with a “mark up” that depends on the level of unemployment. The discussion below is 
closely related to Manning (1993). 
3 This is discussed by Manning (1993), Bean (1994),and Nymoen and Rodseth (2003).   3
highly endogenous variables on the right hand side of the estimated equation, the economic 
interpretation of the adjustment coefficients becomes unclear.
4   
In this paper we try to improve the link between theory and empirical work in 
this area. We formulate a model of wage bargaining in an open economy and derive a simple 
wage equation where all parameters have clear economic interpretations. We estimate the 
wage equation on data for aggregate manufacturing wages in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden. The period is the mid 1960s to the mid 1990s when exchange rates were pegged but 
occasionally adjusted. 
Our theoretical bargaining model differs in two ways from the standard union 
bargaining model (Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991)). First, we assume that firms face 
product demand curves, which are not constant-elastic. Instead, the elasticity increases in 
absolute value with the firm’s relative price.
5   When demand curves have this characteristic, 
we can derive a long run wage equation which resembles empirical error-correction models, 
and where foreign competitors’ prices, exchange rates, and productivity affect wages directly. 
Second, we follow Gottfries & Westermark (1998) and Eriksson & Gottfries (2005) and 
assume that to quit is not a credible threat in the wage bargain. Therefore, unemployment 
benefits play a more indirect role compared to the Nash bargaining model where the utility if 
unemployed is taken as the threat point. 
Our dynamic specification is based explicitly on nominal wage contracts and the 
dynamic adjustment coefficients can be interpreted in terms of the information available to 
wage setters. Most of the period, exchange rates in the Nordic countries were fixed to some 
currency (or basket of currencies) and occasionally adjusted (devalued). The exchange rate 
was the key monetary policy variable and the main monetary policy shocks were discrete 
changes in the exchange rate.
6  By examining how nominal wages responded to exchange rate 
changes and other variables, we obtain measures of nominal wage rigidity. 
The resulting wage equations have a good fit and most parameters are estimated 
with precision and reasonably similar across countries. Wages depend on unemployment, but 
also on the scope for wage increases in the tradable sector. Based on our theoretical model we 
                                                           
4 When, for example, the domestic inflation rate is included in the wage equation, it is hard to know whether a 
significant coefficient arises because wages adjust quickly to inflation or because shocks to wage costs are 
passed  through quickly into prices. 
5This assumption is consistent with evidence of less than full pass-through of exchange rate changes into export 
prices in foreign currency and pricing to market; see e. g. Gottfries (2002). 
6 With integrated financial markets, a fixed exchange rate implies complete loss of control over monetary 
aggregates and interest rates. Although financial markets were regulated until the early 1980’s, the openness of 
the Nordic economies meant that firms had considerable opportunities to move their funds to other countries and   4
interpret this as evidence that workers have bargaining power. Unemployment benefits are 
important, and rising replacement ratios have contributed to increasing unemployment, but the 
elasticity with respect to unemployment benefits is far below the unit value predicted by the 
standard Nash bargaining model. Shocks to exchange rates and productivity have large and 
persistent effects on competitiveness, indicating a high degree of nominal wage rigidity. We 
conclude that exchange rate policy and demand management have played a very important 
role in the medium term.  
Our paper builds on a long tradition of modelling wage formation in the Nordic 
countries. According to the “Scandinavian model of inflation,” wages in the tradable industry 
must adjust to the scope for wage increases, determined as the sum of productivity growth and 
price increases for tradable goods.
7  This model fitted Norwegian and Swedish data for the 
1960’s fairly well, but in the mid 1970’s, wages rose far in excess of the scope, and this was 
followed by a series of devaluations in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.
8   Searching for 
richer models, with better micro-foundations, Scandinavian economists turned to union 
bargaining models and several authors estimated real wage equations which were inspired by 
wage bargaining theory.
9  Starting with Nymoen (1989) and Calmfors & Nymoen (1990), 
subsequent research on aggregate wage determination has been heavily influenced by the 
error-correction approach, where a long run equilibrium condition is embedded in a statistical 
model of the dynamics. Our theoretical model combines elements from the Scandinavian 
model of inflation, union bargaining theory, and efficiency wage theory, and we derive a 
wage equation which has similarities with the error-correction equations estimated in recent 
work by e. g. Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) and Bårdsen et. al (2005). 
In Section 2 we derive a long run wage equation relating the wage to the scope 
for wage increases, unemployment, and unemployment benefits. In Section 3 we introduce 
nominal wage rigidity and derive a short run wage equation where unexpected shocks cause 
temporary deviations from the long run equilibrium condition. In Section 4 we present data 
and test for cointegration. Empirical results for our baseline dynamic wage equation are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
hence the central banks had very limited scope to affect money supply and interest rates. The central banks had 
to set the interest rate that was required in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate. 
7 See Aukrust, Holte & Stoltz (1967), Edengren, Faxen & Ohdner (1970), Aukrust (1977), Lindbeck (1979). 
8 Observing wage increases far in excess of what was predicted by the Scandinavian model, economists 
considered the scope as - at most - a long run determinant of wages. Calmfors (1979) combined a Phillips curve 
with a long run zero profit condition to a model of fluctuations around the long run course determined by foreign 
prices and productivity.  
9Examples are Hersoug, Kjaer & Rødseth (1986), the country studies in Calmfors (1990), and Holm, 
Honkapohja, & Koskela (1994). This work was inspired by union bargaining theory (e g Calmfors (1982), 
Oswald (1985)) and the empirical application to the UK by Layard & Nickell (1986).   5
presented in Section 5 and alternative specifications are considered in Section 6. We end by 
summarising our results and comparing with other studies. 
 
2. The Long Run Wage Equation 
Let the production function of an individual firm be  ()
1 YKZ N
α α − =  where Z is an 
exogenously given technology factor, K  is capital and N is the number of workers. Capital is 
rented at a price R and there are no adjustment costs for capital. Turnover among workers is 
( ) / SWW A N  and depends on the firm’s own wage,W , the average wage, W , and the 
probability A that a worker searching on the job does get a new job. The function S is 
decreasing and convex in the relevant region.
10  Turnover is associated with a cost  W c per 
quitting worker so the profit of the firm is: 
  () () / PY W cWS W W A N RK Π= − + − ,  (1) 
where P  is the price set by the firm. Given factor prices, a cost minimizing choice of input 
quantities implies the cost function: 
  () () ( )
1 1 ,, , , , / / CWWARYZ W c W SWW A RY Z
α α α κ
− − =+ , (2) 
where  ()
1 1
− − − =
α α α α κ . The demand facing an individual firm is  ( ) / DPP where P  is the 
average price in the market. After wages have been set, the firm sets the price and hires 
capital and labour so as to maximise profits. Without loss of generality we may think of the 
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10 See Eriksson & Gottfries (2005) for a simple derivation. W denotes the wage paid by the producer, including 
the tax on labour paid by employers. The latter is assumed to be proportional, so it does not affect the relative 
wage paid to the worker.   6
  Before we turn to bargaining, let us consider what wage the firm would set if it 
was free to set the wage. This is the “efficiency wage,” W
e, which minimizes cost per unit: 
0 ) / ( ' 1 = + A W W cS
e .     (6) 
The efficiency wage, 
e W , is such that the direct cost of a marginal wage increase is equal to 
the benefit from lower turnover costs. If, for example,  ( ) ( ) // SWW WW
σ −
=  we get the 
efficiency wage as:  ()





= cA W W
e . The optimal relative wage increases with the state 
of the labour market, measured by the probability that an employed job seeker gets a job.  
 
Bargaining 
We assume that bargaining occurs in an individual firm, or a group of identical firms. The 
firm/group is small enough that it takes aggregate labour market conditions as given. The 
firm’s objective is to maximize profits and the workers/union cares about the real wage 
c
i P W / , where P
c is the consumer price index. To model bargaining, we follow Gottfries & 
Westermark (1998).  If there is a conflict, there is no production, no wages are paid, and the 
two parties make alternating bids. When a bid has been rejected, it may turn out that the 
workers are unable to continue the strike, in which case the firm can set the wage that it 
prefers, 
e W . Let δ  be the discount factor relevant to the period between bids and let φ  be the 
probability that the workers cannot continue the strike. The worker’s optimal bid 
w W  is such 
that the firm is indifferent between taking the bid and continuing the conflict: 
() ,, 1 ,, ,,
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⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
; (7) 
the function Π is defined in (3). Analogously, the firm’s optimal bid 
f W  is such that the 



















φ φ δ 1 .     (8) 
In equilibrium the first bid is accepted.
11  Assuming that the worker makes the first bid, so 
that 
w WW = , we can substitute  (8) into (7) to get an equation that determines W: 
     () () ,, 1 1 ,, ,,
ee WW W W
AA A
WW W WW WW
δφ δ φδ φ φ
⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ΘΘ Θ ⎛⎞ Π= − Π − + + Π ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎦
.  (9) 
                                                           
11 Thus the wage depends on who makes the first bid but if we let the time between bids go to zero, the strategic 
advantage of the first bidder disappears.   7
From (6) we know that  W W
e /  is a function of A and thus (6) and (9) implicitly determine 





Θ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
.     (10) 
The variable Θ summarizes the key factors determining the surplus to be shared between the 
firm and the workers. How does the wage depend on Θ?  
 
Proposition 1: The bargained wage increases with Θ if and only if workers have bargaining 
power and demand becomes more elastic as the relative price increases.  
Proof:  See Appendix 1. 
 
To get some intuition for this result, consider an increase in the market priceP . At an 
unchanged price P this implies a decrease in the firm’s relative price  / PP  so demand 
becomes less elastic. The firm will raise its price and the surplus per worker will increase; 
hence the bargained wage will also rise. 
If demand is constant-elastic the wage is independent of Θ.
12  This case is often 
discussed in the literature (e. g. Layard, Nickell & Jackman 1991). But evidence on pricing 
behaviour suggests that the price elasticity is indeed increasing (in absolute value) in the 
relative price. Less than full pass-through of exchange rate changes into export prices and 
evidence on price discrimination (pricing to market) in international markets can be readily 
explained when demand functions have this characteristic.
13  
  The wage does not depend on the consumer price index. What matters is the 
competition for workers: the average wage level and how easy it is for employed job 
searchers to get a job. When workers have bargaining power the wage will depend on the 
firm’s ability to pay: productivity, product price, and the required return on capital (all 
included inΘ). 
 
Foreign influences via goods and capital markets 
In order to understand wage formation in a small open economy with a pegged exchange rate, 
the distinction between tradable and nontradable goods is important. With a pegged exchange 
rate, foreign competitors’ prices are exogenous for the small open economy, and this affects 
                                                           
12 In this case we can write  ( ) ( ) i A W i W A i W i W Θ Π = Θ Π , , ~ , , ,  for some function Π ~ . 
13 See e. g. Goldberg & Knetter (1997), Gottfries (2002).   8
prices of domestically produced traded goods. Since the prices of nontradable goods are 
largely determined by costs, there is a strong simultaneity between nontradable goods’ prices 
and wages.
14 For this reason, we will not try to estimate a wage equation for the nontradable 
sector. Instead we use the price equation for nontradable goods to solve for the wage in the 
tradable sector as a function of more exogenous variables. 
Assume that there are two sectors, a tradable and a non-tradable sector, with 
wages 
N W W,  and productivities 
N Z Z, , and that firms in the two sectors hire from a common 
labour market with average wage W . The latter is approximated by  () ()
λ λ −
=
1 N W W W  where 
λ  reflects the size of the traded goods sector. Firms in the traded goods’ sector compete only 
with foreign firms, who charge price 
* P  in foreign currency and the exchange rate is E. 


























































N N .   (12) 













, , 1 .     (13) 
Equations (12) and (13) implicitly define a relation  ( ) A H W W
N = / . Using the definition of 
W  we get  ()
1 / 1 − =
λ A WH W  and substituting into (11) we get: 
  () ( ) ( )
( ) λ λ λ / 1 / 1 1 , /
− − = Θ A H A W A H F .     (14) 
which determines   Θ / W  as function of and A. Log-linearizing we can write: 
  [] a r p e z a w γ α
α
γ θ + − +
−




      (15) 
where lower case letters denote logs and 0 γ >  . Here and below we leave out constant terms.  
We assume that capital goods can be bought and sold in the international market 
at the price 
* p e + .
15  Adjustment costs are disregarded and the log of the rental price of 
capital is taken to be 
* ˆ p e r r + + = , where  ( )
e e p e i r
* ln ˆ Δ − Δ − + = δ ,  i is an interest rate in 
                                                           
14 In fact, the “prices” of some services are nothing but wage costs per hour. 
15 This assumption is made to simplify.   9
domestic currency, δ  is the depreciation rate, and 
e e p e
* Δ + Δ  is the expected future increase 
in value of the capital good. Substituting into equation (15) we get 





− + + = ˆ
1
* .     (16) 
When wages are bargained over in a fixed exchange rate regime, the wage level 
is “anchored” to the exchange rate, foreign competitors’ prices, and productivity in the 
tradable sector. Productivity in the non-traded goods sector is irrelevant for wages because 
productivity changes there are passed on into prices. The role of monetary policy is to peg the 
nominal exchange rate. Of course, this is the key insight in the “Scandinavian model of 
inflation” which was mentioned in the introduction. There are some differences, however, 
compared to the original specification of the Scandinavian model. In the original model, 
exporting firms were assumed to be price-takers and wages depended only on foreign prices 
and productivity. Our model is more general since it allows for variations in the relative prices 
of tradable goods and for labour market conditions to affect wages. The required return on 
capital is an additional factor that determines the scope for wage increases. To simplify 
notation, it is convenient to define the scope for wage increases as 






− + + ≡ .     (17) 
 
Labour market conditions and unemployment benefits 
Labour market conditions affect the wage bargain, not because workers threaten to quit, but 
because a strong labour market decreases employers’ resistance to wage increases via the 
efficiency wage mechanism.
 16 What is relevant for wage setting in the model above is the 
probability for employed job seekers to get a job. The easier it is to get a job, the weaker is 
employers’ resistance to wage increases. In the baseline specification, we simply use minus 
the log of the unemployment rate as one indicator of the chance to get a job. 
Unemployment benefits do not affect wage bargaining via the threat point, but 
unemployment benefits will affect the search intensity and choosiness of the unemployed 
workers, and hence the effective competition that employed workers face when they look for 
                                                           
16 Holden (1990) and Gottfries & Westermark (1998) emphasise this point.   10
a new job.
17 To capture such an effect, we include the log of the replacement ratio (ratio of 
benefits to the wage) rr in the wage equation. Thus our long run wage equation is
18 
rr u s w β γ + − = − .     (18) 
 
Labour demand 
On the demand side, the model implies a positive relationship between w-s and 
unemployment. To see this simply, note that if  0 = α , (5) implies that the number of 
unemployed workers is   
() ()





LN LD H A A D
ZEP Z Z
λ− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ −= − Ω − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 (19) 
where L is labour supply, N is employment, M and M
N are the numbers of firms in the two 
sectors, and the chance to get a job, A, depends on the level of unemployment.
19    For 
empirical purposes we approximate labour demand with a log linear relation: 
() ϕ η − − = s w u ,     (20) 




3. Nominal Wage Rigidity  
A very large fraction of the labour force in the Nordic countries is covered by union contracts 
and the length of union wage contracts is typically between one and three years. Much of the 
time, union contracts have been relatively well coordinated and wage contracts covering 
several years always specify wage increases to take place during the contract period. These 
observations suggest that non-overlapping Fischer contracts, rather than Taylor fixed-wage 
contracts, best characterise the Nordic labour markets.
21 To derive a dynamic wage equation, 
we think of wages for period t as being predetermined, set at some earlier point in time t-j, 
based on expectations that wage bargainers had at that time.
22 We use  j t E −  to denote the 
                                                           
17 Microeconometric evidence suggests a statistically significant but economically modest effect; see e g 
Holmlund (1998), Carling, Holmlund & Vejsiu (2001). 
18 In Appendix 1 we outline a model where unemployed workers face random search costs and show that the 
chance to get a job for an employed job searcher depends on unemployment and the replacement ratio. 
19 If  0 > α  the function becomes more complicated and contains the required return on capital.  
20 As we will see, there are indications that ϕ  is nonstationary so there is no stable long run demand function. 
21 The recent paper by Mankiw & Reis (2002) formulates a model with infrequent updating of information that 
has similar dynamics to the Fischer contract model. 
22 See Gottfries (1992) for an explanation of nominal wage contracts.   11
expectation conditional on information available to wage-setters when they set wages for 
period t.  
 Letting  t W  be the wage cost per hour, including a proportional wage tax, we 
have  ()
c
t t W W τ + = 1,  w h e r e  
c
t W  is the contracted wage paid to the worker (before personal 
income tax) and  t τ  is the tax on labour, or in logs:  t
c
t t w w τ + =  where  () τ τ + = 1 ln t .
23 It is 
c
t W  that is written into the labour contract, but wage setters do not know what the labour tax 
will be, so their expectation of total wage cost per hour is:  
( ) () ( ) ( ) t j t t t t j t
c
t t j t E w E w w E τ τ τ − − − − − = + = .     (21) 
Assume that
c
t w  is set to fulfil the long run wage equation (18), but with expected values 
replacing actual values which are not yet known: 
( ) () ( ) ( ) t t j t t j t t j t t j t rr E u E s E w E μ β γ + + − = − − − − .   (22) 
Here we have added a shock  t μ  which represents unobserved factors that temporarily affect 
wages. Further we take unemployment to be determined by (20) with an autoregressive 
demand shock  t t t ξ ρϕ ϕ + = −1  where  t ξ  is unpredictable and  1 ≤ ρ . Assuming that wage 
setters observe variables dated t-j we can derive the expected value of  t u  as: 
   () () () () ( ) ( )
jj
t j t t jt t t j t jt t t j t j t j Eu Ews Ews w s u ηρ ϕ ηρ η −− − − − − − ⎡ ⎤ =− − =− − − − ⎣ ⎦ .   (23) 
Substituting into (22), solving for the expected wage, and using (21) we get: 
() () [] () ( ) .













+ = − − − − − −
t
t j t t t j t j t j t j t
j
t j t t E rr E u s w s E w   (24) 
Lagged wages and labour market conditions enter the wage equation, not because wage 
setters have irrational backward-looking expectations, but because past wages and labour 
market conditions are indicators of unobserved and persistent demand shocks. Expected 
changes in the labour tax are born by the workers but unexpected changes are born by firms.  
 
A measure of nominal wage rigidity 
(.) j t E −  is defined as the expectation conditional on information available to wage-setters in 
period t-j. We do not know exactly when wages were set and even if we did, we do not know 
what information wage-setters had, so it is hard to say what  (.) j t E −  really is. We therefore use 
an approach suggested by Gottfries & Persson (1988), that allows us to decompose wage-  12
setters’ expectations into a predictable and an unpredictable part relative to pre-specified 
information set.  
Consider wage setters expectations about the foreign price, 
*
t p , and consider an 
information set  j t− Ψ  containing lagged variables which are observed by the econometrician.
24  
Assume that all wage-setters know at least  j t− Ψ  when they set wages for period t, but perhaps 
more than that. Now we can think of two extreme possibilities. One is that they have no more 
relevant information than  j t− Ψ  so their expectation is  ( ) ( ) j t t t j t p E p E − − Ψ =
* * . Another extreme 
possibility is that they have enough information to perfectly predict the outcome: 
( )
* *
t t j t p p E = − . Gottfries & Persson (1988) show that when agents’ information contains at 
least j t− Ψ  we can write agents’ expectations as a weighted average between these two 
extremes plus a noise term: 






t t p j t t p t j t p g p p g p E g p E η η + − = + − + Ψ = − −
* * * * * 1 ) (  (25) 
where  ( ) j t t t
u
t p E p p − Ψ − =
* * *  is the innovation relative to the pre-specified information set.
25  
The coefficient  p g  is between zero and one and reflects the information that agents have. If 
they make perfect forecasts about 
*
t p  when they set wages,  p g  equals zero; if they know no 
more than  j t− Ψ ,  p g equals unity. Thus, the parameter  p g  measures the extent to which agents 
do not foresee innovations in
*
t p . The same decomposition can be made for the other right 
hand side variables. Substituting (25) into (24), and similarly for other variables, and 
subtracting  j t j t s w − − −  on both sides we get our basic wage equation: 











t r t r j t u j t j t w j t j t t t
g z g p g e g
rr g rr b u b s w b s w s w
ε τ τ + + − − −
























r b . In the long run, the wage is 
proportional to the “scope” for wage increases. Because of nominal wage rigidity, unexpected 
variations in the nominal exchange rate, foreign prices, and productivity cause deviations 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
23 A proportional wage tax does not affect the relative wage which determines search on the job in our theoretical 
model. Progressive income taxation has different effects, but we disregard this.  
24 In our empirical implementation, j= 2 and  2 t Ψ −  includes 
*
2 − t p  and 
*
3 − t p .    13
from the long run solution. Variations in the labour tax affect the wage cost (which includes 
the labour tax) only if they are unexpected.  The g-coefficients measure wage rigidity because 
they tell us how much information wage setters have when they set wages. A positive value of 
e g , for example, implies that wages respond slowly to exchange rate shocks because agents 
have less than perfect information about exchange rates when they set wages. This may be 
because wages are set earlier or because data is available with delays.
26  The error term  t ε  
contains unobserved shocks and the noise in our expectations measures. 
 
4. Data, Trends and Cointegration  
Most of the data is the same as in Nymoen & Rødseth  (2003) and documented in Evjen & 
Langseth (1997). Data for wages and productivity refer to industry, which we take to be the 
tradable sector of the economy. The wage is measured as the wage sum, including social 
security contributions, divided by the number of hours worked. Productivity is measured as 
value added in fixed prices divided by the number of hours worked. The foreign price is a 
trade-weighted index of foreign export prices of major trading partners, and the exchange rate 
is a trade-weighted index of nominal exchange rates.  
In most of our analysis we consider a baseline model where we disregard capital 
() 0 = α .
27 In this case, the scope is  t t t t z p e s + + =
* , where zt is labour productivity in the 
traded goods sector. Figure 1 shows unemployment and wage relative to scope. 
Unemployment has increased in all four countries, but it started to increase earlier and 
reached much higher levels in Denmark and Finland compared to Norway and Sweden. Peaks 
in unemployment are followed by decreases in the wage relative to scope, but  there is no 
evident long correlation. The positive trend in unemployment does not produce a negative 
trend in wage relative to scope, except possibly for Sweden. Some other variable must enter 
into the wage setting relation and one candidate is the replacement ratio.  
Figure 2 shows the replacement ratio and wage relative to scope. In all four 
countries, there was a general increase in benefits in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. This is 
long before the rise in unemployment, but the benefit hike may have contributed to high 
nominal wage increases in the early 1970’s. This period saw a dramatic deterioration of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
25  p
t η is by construction orthogonal to  tj Ψ −  and 
*
t p ; see Gottfries & Persson (1988) or Gottfries (2002).  
26Obviously, the estimates will depend on how the information set is specified. For g to be identified, the 
information set must be specified so that  ( ) j t t p E − Ψ *   is sufficiently different from  *
t p  
27 We reintroduce the required return on capital in the sensitivity analysis.   14
competitiveness in all four countries. Since then, benefits have developed quite differently. 
The trend in benefits could potentially explain some of the secular increase in unemployment 
in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  
Figure 3 shows that there is a clear negative relation between changes in the 
nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency) and changes in the wage relative to the 
scope. Devaluations bring about an improvement in competitiveness, at least in the short run.  
Before estimating the structural model, we first examine trends and 
cointegration relations between the key variables w-s, rr and u. A priori, one may argue that 
neither w-s, nor u or rr could really be nonstationary. But there appear to be trends in several 
of the variables, and in most cases, unit roots cannot be rejected. To avoid estimating spurious 
correlations it may be cautious to treat the variables as I(1).    15
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When variables are trending we may think of (18) and (20) as potential 
cointegration relationships. If γ  is finite and variables are I(1), the long run wage setting 
curve (18) implies cointegration between w-s, b, and u. In the special case when workers have 
no bargaining power so that the wage setting schedule is vertical, β  goes to infinity but  γ β / 
takes a finite value, and w-s drops out of the wage setting relationship. 
If 1 < ρ  there is a stable long run labour demand function (20) implying 
cointegration between u and w-s.
28  But if shocks to labour demand are permanent () 1 = ρ  
there is no stable long run labour demand relation between w-s and u. One reason may be that 
our measure of competitors’ prices, p*, is imperfect and does not fully capture the world price 
developments which are relevant for the export industry in a particular country. The potential 
cointegration relationships are summarized in Table 1.  
  Using the Johansen method to examine the number of cointegrating relations we 
considered models with and without a trend in the cointegrating relationship. For Denmark 
and Sweden, we found evidence for one cointegrating relationship in both models using both 
the trace and λ max test statistic. For Norway, we found indications of one cointegrating 
relationship in the model with trend. For Finland there is no evidence of cointegration 
relationship in any of the models.  
The Engle-Granger method produced very different results. Now we found 
evidence of cointegration for Sweden and for Finland in the model without a trend. For 
Norway there was no significant evidence of cointegration in any of the models, but the test 
statistics are fairly close to the critical values. For Denmark there is no evidence of 
cointegration relationship in any of the models. Since different tests for cointegration give 
very different results we cannot draw any definite conclusions.  
Assuming that there is one cointegration vector, we estimate the cointegration 
relationship using two alternative methods: the Johansen method and Dynamic OLS. As 
above, we considered models with and without a deterministic trend in the cointegration 
relationship. Unemployment is significant, with the expected negative sign, in many of the 
specifications. The coefficient for benefits is more unstable, but has the expected positive sign 
in some cases. Overall, these results suggest that there is at most one cointegration 
relationship between these variables, and if there is one, it is a negative relation between 
unemployment and wages - a wage setting curve rather than a labour demand equation. 
                                                           
28 A special case is that there is a long run zero profit condition that makes labour demand horizontal and w-s 
stationary. In almost all cases, ADF tests support nonstationarity of w-s, so this case does not appear to be 
relevant.   19
Table 1. Special Cases of the Model  
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Note:   The wage setting equation is rr u s w β γ + − = − .  The slope of the labour demand curveη  is assumed 
to be finite. If η  is infinite, a stable labour demand relation implies that w-s is that it is stationary.    20
5. Estimation of the Dynamic Wage Equation  
To allow for unobserved trending factors, which affect the functioning of the labour market, a 
deterministic trend is included. Because of missing data for Denmark we omit unexpected 
variations in the labour tax in our baseline estimation, i. e. we set  0 = τ g . All explanatory 
variables except the exchange rate are taken to be exogenous or predetermined.
29  The 
contractual structure suggests that the error should be a low order moving average. To allow 
for this, we estimated the wage equations by GMM allowing for first order MA errors.  








t rr z p e , , ,
*  and 
u
t τ  were constructed using forecasting 
(projection) equations for each variable including a constant and the variable itself lagged 2 
and 3 years. The projection errors were constructed as 
() 3 2 2 1 0 3 2, − − − − − − − = − = t t t t t t t
u
t x h x h h x x x x P x x . If we first estimate the projection 
equations and then use the calculated projection errors in the wage equation we will have a 




Simultaneity of the exchange rate  
As always, a major empirical problem is that monetary policy is endogenous. In this period, 
the exchange rates were pegged and the Nordic countries went through several “devaluation 
cycles” where the official policy was to maintain a fixed exchange rate, but periods of high 
inflation lead to loss of competitiveness and subsequent devaluation. The decision to devalue 
a currency is clearly not random and the question is whether this will lead to biased estimates. 
To answer this question, we must think of what causes devaluations. 
The political costs of maintaining the fixed exchange rate rise in a recession, so 
devaluation should be more likely when unemployment is high.
31  This implies some 
correlation between two right hand side variables in the wage equation, but such a correlation 
does not pose a problem unless the correlation is so high that multicolinearity becomes a 
problem, which is clearly not the case.  
                                                           
29 Manning (1993) has argued that wage equations are typically unidentified because all variables which affect 
unemployment will also affect the wage bargain. Here, lagged unemployment is treated as predetermined.  
30 With respect to the exchange rate, an alternative would have been to use the forward exchange rate as a 
measure of the expected exchange rate. Doing this would be complicated by the fact that countries pegged to 
different currencies, and baskets of currencies, in different periods. Also, we know that forward rates predict 
changes in exchange rates very poorly and this is the case also for our projection equation. Most of the variation 
in the exchange goes into e
u. Hence the results should not be much affected. 
31 Edin & Vredin (1993) found that devaluations in the Nordic countries were more likely when the economy 
was in a recession. The currency crisis model by Ozkan & Sutherland (1998) illustrates the political mechanism.   21
If wage setters anticipate devaluation they will raise wages and this will in itself 
make devaluation more likely. Without some commitment device for monetary policy, we 
may end up in a bad equilibrium with continuous high wage increases and devaluations (Horn 
& Persson (1988)). This possibility does not contradict the approach taken here because it 
would just mean that most changes in the nominal exchange rate would be anticipated by 
wage setters and hence they would have small effects on competitiveness () 0 = e g .
32  
A more difficult problem arises if there is some state variable which affects both 
the wage and the exchange rate, but is omitted from the estimated equation. Such a variable 
may be expected future output or employment. A pessimistic outlook may lead to lower wage 
increases and, at the same time, make devaluation more likely. This will lead us to attribute 
too much of the improvement in competitiveness to the nominal depreciation of the currency. 
Our estimate of ge will be biased upwards. 
But we could also imagine the simultaneity going the other way. If unions 
become more aggressive and demand higher wages ( t μ  increases) policy makers may try to 
bring temporary relief by devaluing the currency.
33  Such monetary accommodation of 
unexplained wage shocks will lead us to underestimate the effects on wage/scope of truly 
exogenous changes in the nominal exchange rate. Our estimate of ge will be biased 
downwards.  
To sum up, there are risks that the estimates are biased due to simultaneity, but it 
is not clear which way the bias goes. To construct a measure of exogenous policy shocks, we 
estimate a “reaction function” for the exchange rate where we regress the change in the 
nominal exchange rate on lags of unemployment, wage relative to scope, and current and 
lagged real value added in manufacturing, (all in logs).
34 We take the residuals from this 







                                                           
32 In fact, this is the opposite to what we find below. 
33 During the period with pegged exchange rates, decisions to devalue were effectively taken by the government. 
34 For all countries,  et Δ  was positively related to ut-1 and wt-1–st-1 and negatively related to value added in the 
previous period, but only some of the coefficients were significantly different from zero.  
35 This is analogous to the structural VAR approach where one effectively estimates a policy rule for the 
monetary policy variable and interprets the residuals from this regression as truly exogenous policy shocks; see 
Blanchard (1989), Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1999).   22
Table 2 shows the results for the baseline dynamic wage equation (26).
36 The equations have 
a good fit and all behavioural coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level with the 
expected (positive) sign.
37  The coefficient for unemployment, bu, is very similar across 
countries. The coefficient for the replacement ratio, br, is similar for Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden, but higher for Norway. The significant coefficient for the lagged wage, bw, is 
consistent with the existence of a long run equilibrium wage setting relation between w-s,  u 
and rr. Note, however, that according to our theoretical model, bw should not be interpreted as 
an adjustment speed. Rather it reflects the slopes of the labour demand and wage setting 
curves.
38  This illustrates the dangers of jumping to economic interpretations without an 
explicit economic model.
39 
The adjustment coefficient with respect to the benefit ratio is poorly identified 
and because of convergence problems we set this coefficient to zero in the country 
regressions. All other g-coefficients are significantly different from zero indicating less than 
full adjustment of wages to unexpected changes in the explanatory variables. The coefficients 
ge and gz are both close to unity, indicating considerable nominal wage rigidity. Within a two-
year period, nominal wages hardly respond to shocks to exchange rates and productivity. 
Foreign price inflation is to a much greater extent incorporated into wage increases, possibly 
because it is more predictable than exchange rates and productivity. Significant trend terms 
for Denmark and Norway indicate deterioration of labour market performance which cannot 
be explained within our model. This may reflect omitted variables or persistence mechanisms 
which have not been explicitly included in our model.
40   
                                                           
36 The simultaneously estimated forecasting equations are reported in Appendix 3 Table A6. 
37 The standard t-distribution is used which is correct provided that there is cointegration, so that each coefficient 
can be written as a coefficient on a stationary combination of variables; see e. g. Stock & Watson (1988). tests 
for cointegration were performed in the previous section. 
38 bw reflects the amount of wage adjustment needed to restore equilibrium. 
39 If the equation had been derived from another theoretical model, e g with quadratic adjustment costs, it is 
possible that bw could have been interpreted as an adjustment speed. 
40 One indication of a less well functioning labour market is increased duration of unemployment; see e. g. 
Holmlund (2003). Persistence of unemployment is discussed by e. g. Blanchard (1991), Bean (1994), Eriksson 
(2001,2002), Eriksson & Gottfries (2005).   23
Table 2. Baseline wage equation.  
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gr  0 0  0  0  0.645* 
(0.346) 
Trend De  0.00328** 
(0.000602) 
     0.00532** 
(0.00151) 
Trend Fi   -0.000396 
(0.00112) 
  0.00002 
(0.00200) 








s. e.  0.013 0.018  0.029  0.020  0.016,  0.015, 
0.049, 0.028 
R
2  0.98 0.98  0.86  0.98  0.97,  0.99, 
0.66, 0.96 



















































































Notes: The estimated equation is (26) with  0 ≡ α  and 0 ≡ τ g .  Because of convergence problems, gb  is set to 
zero in the country regressions. The equation was estimated with GMM allowing for first order moving average 
errors. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. ** and * denote significance on the 5 and 10 percent level.   24
  Since the parameter estimates are reasonably similar across countries it is 
interesting to summarize the evidence from the Nordic countries in the form of a panel 
estimate. The last column shows panel estimates with country-specific constants and trends. 
All behavioural coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. In the panel estimation, gr is 
well identified and takes a value which is similar to the other adjustment coefficients. 
  
Long run implications 
There are three regression coefficients in the dynamic wage equation and four underlying 
parameters, so in general we cannot infer all the long run coefficients from our dynamic 
regression. But provided that  1 ≤ ρ ,  w u b b /  and  w r b b /  are lower bounds on γ  and β , with 
equality if  1 = ρ  (see Table 1). The cointegration tests did not show any indication of a stable 
long run labour demand relation between w-s and u. If, in line with these results, we assume 
that 1 = ρ , we can calculate the long run parameters  η β γ , ,  from the estimated coefficients 
(see lower part of Table 2). Furthermore, η  can be calculated as  ( ) u w b b / 1− = η  independent 
of the value of ρ . 
According to the panel estimates  15 . 0 = γ , not far from the Blanchflower & 
Oswald (1994) benchmark of 0.1. An increase in unemployment from 5 to 5.5 percentage 
units will reduce the wage 1.5 percent.  
The panel estimate of β  is 0.39, so an increase in the replacement ratio from 60 
to 66 percent will raise the wage 3.9 percent for a given level of unemployment. The elasticity 
of the wage with respect to the benefit level is 0.28  ( ) ( ) β β + 1 /  which is far below the unit 
elasticity implied by the standard Nash bargaining model with unemployment benefits as 
threat point. This is consistent with our theory, which suggests a more indirect role for 
benefits in wage formation. Still, benefits have a substantial effect. 
On the demand side,  17 = η  implies that a 1 percent increase in the wage will 
raise unemployment by 17 percent, e. g. from 5 to 5.85 percentage units. This corresponds to 
an aggregate labour demand elasticity with respect to w-s equal to 0.9.
41 
These long run coefficients measure the direct effects on wage setting (18) and 
labour demand (20), but an increase in the replacement ratio will set off indirect adjustment as 
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  According to Gottfries (2002) a 10 percent increase in 
wage costs will raise Swedish export prices about 4 percent, leading to a decrease in exports of about 12 percent. 
The total effect on employments depends also on domestic responses to wage increases.   25
the increase in unemployment moderates the wage increase. The total effect of a 10 percent 
increase in the benefit ratio is a 1.1 percent wage increase  ( ) ( ) 11 . 0 1 / = +γη β  and a 19 
percent increase in unemployment  ( ) () 9 . 1 1 / = +γη ηβ . Starting from a 60 percent replacement 
ratio and 5 percent unemployment, an increase of the replacement ratio to 66 percent will 
increase the unemployment rate to 6 percent.  Because of the high demand elasticity, much of 
the incidence falls on unemployment. This is a substantial effect and similar to what Layard, 
Nickell & Jackman (1991) and others have found in cross country regressions, though large 
relative to Nickell and Layard (1999).
42  
Comparing our long run effects to Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) we find that the 
results are qualitatively similar, but our wage curve parameters are larger.
43  Note, however, 
that the dependent variable in Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) is the product real wage in terms of 
the domestic producer price while our equation determines the real wage in terms of foreign 
prices. Because of nontraded goods and partial pass through of wage costs to tradable prices, 
we should expect the product real wage in terms of own prices to respond less to shocks. 
Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) include productivity growth on the right hand side of 
their error correction model without making any distinction between expected and unexpected 
changes. According to their results (page 15) higher productivity growth will reduce the wage 
share and unemployment in the long run. According to our structural model, only unexpected 
productivity growth should affect wage relative to scope, and we have imposed this in our 
econometric specification.
44  We find that productivity shocks have large and persistent 
effects on competitiveness,
45 but permanent changes in productivity growth should not affect 
wage relative to scope. 
 
6. Alternative Specifications  
In this section we consider several variations of our baseline model. These include unexpected 
changes in the labour tax, inclusion of capital costs, alternative measures of the chance to get 
a job, and labour market policy.  
 
                                                           
42 See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) chapter 11 for review and references. 
43 Nymoen & Rødseth (2003) find an average elasticity of the wage with respect to unemployment of 0.13 
(calculated from Table 3 using the “Finland-A” specification). The average elasticity of the wage with respect to 
the benefit ratio is 0.18. Also, our coefficients are larger than those obtained by Bårdsen, Eitrheim, Jansen & 
Nymoen (2004, ch. 5.5) for Norwegian data. 
44 Similarly, we do not allowed taxes to affect w-s in the long run. Proportional taxes are born by the workers in 
our model and we do not consider the effects of progressive taxation; see e. g. Holmlund & Kolm (1995).   26
Unexpected changes in the labour tax 
With the wage before labour tax set in a contract, unexpected increases in the labour tax 
should raise w-s temporarily. In Sweden, it is often argued that the drastic increase in labour 
taxes in 1974-1976 contributed to the first Swedish “cost crisis”.  Including unexpected 
changes in the labour tax we found that labour taxes raised labour costs in Sweden, but not in 
Finland or Norway.
46. Danish labour taxes have been low and there is no consistent and 
reliable series for Denmark. 
 
Capital Costs 
A higher required return on capital should reduce the scope for wage increases. So far we 
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h t t t p e i r
* ln ˆ + + Δ − Δ − + = δ  we measure it by the government bond rate and set δ  equal to 
0.10 to reflect depreciation and risk premium. We regressed changes in the exchange rate and 
the foreign price level (from t to t+2) on their own lags (t-2,t-3) and use the fitted values as 
proxies for the expectations. In this case, Zt should ideally be a measure of factor productivity. 
Since we do not have data on capital input that allows us to measure factor productivity, we 
use labour productivity as proxy for Z  and include linear and quadratic trends in the 
equation.
47   
Our measure on the required return  t r ˆ  was low in the 1970s because high 
inflation was not matched by correspondingly higher nominal interest rates. In all four 
countries, the required return increased from about 10% at the start of the sample to about 15 
percent at the end. We found no evidence that wage setters took account of the required return 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
45 Aside from nominal wage rigidity, lack of wage adjustment to productivity shocks may occur because some 
fluctuations in measured productivity reflect variations in factor utilization (see Carlsson 2003). 
46 This finding is consistent with the results in a number of previous studies of Swedish wage setting, where it is 
typically found that labour taxes influence labour costs in the short run, see the survey in Forslund (1997). 
47 The production function can be written   () ()
α α α −
= − 1
/ / 1 N Y K Y Z . On a steady state growth path where 
K/Y is constant,  Z is proportional to Y/N.   27
on capital when setting wages. Either wage setters disregard capital costs or we have a poor 
measure of capital costs.
48   
 
Using vacancies to measure the state of the labour market:  
What is relevant for wage setting in our bargaining model is the probability that an employed 
job seeker finds a job. The easier it is to get a job, the weaker is employers’ resistance to wage 
increases. In our baseline estimation we used minus the unemployment rate as a measure of 
this probability. A more direct measure of the probability to get a job is the number of 













 ,    (28) 
where V is the number of vacancies, L is the labour force, N is aggregate employment, and S 
is the fraction of workers searching on the job, and   ( ) L N L U / − =  is the rate of 
unemployment. We use this formula to construct an alternative measure of the chance to get a 
job.
49  Since we do not have time series data on search on the job, we treat S as a constant and 
set it to 0.05.
50 Since vacancies are more volatile than unemployment and the constant S is 
added in the denominator, the short run variation in  t A  is driven mostly by vacancies. Does 
our alternative measure of the chance to get a job work better than unemployment as an 
indicator of labour market conditions in the wage equation?  We found that this is not the 
case. Our new measure of  t a  is significant for only two of the countries.
 51  The other 
coefficients are essentially unchanged. One reason may be poor quality of vacancy data. 
 
Active labour market policy 
So far, we assumed that only open unemployment contributes to downward wage pressure. 
But workers in active labour market programs may also contribute to downward wage 
pressure if they look for jobs while in programs or because they become more competitive 
                                                           
48 The low calculated capital cost in the 1970s was partly due to regulation of credit markets, so firms may have 
been rationed implying that the true cost of funds was in fact higher in the 1970s. 
49 In previous studies of wage formation, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment has sometimes been used as a 
measure of labour market pressure (see e. g. Jacobsson & Lindbeck  1971). Our model motivates the use of these 
two variables, and also yields a specific functional form. 
50 For some references concerning on the job search, see Eriksson & Gottfries (2005). . If unemployed workers 
are at a disadvantage in the competition for jobs, the unemployment rate may have a weak effect on wages and 
vacancies may be a better indicator of the chance for employed workers to find a job; see Eriksson & Gottfries 
(2005) and Eriksson (2001, 2002).  
51 In principle, vacancy data should improve our measure of the chance to get a job, but on the other hand 
vacancy data is known to be unreliable. For a long time period data may not be comparable because of changes 
in search methods and registration.   28
when they leave the programs. To see if this is the case, we specify the probability to get a job 
as 







.     (29) 
The numerator is the number of vacancies, occurring because of exogenous separations, s, and 
because the fraction searching on the job, S, find jobs with probability A. The job searchers 
consist of workers in open unemployment, L-N, workers in labour market programs, M, and 
workers searching on the job, SN. The coefficientν  measures the extent to which workers in 
programs compete for jobs.
52 This equation can be solved for A. In order to avoid highly 
nonlinear estimation we take a linear approximation of the log of A at the point where M=0: 
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Thus we add M/(L-N) in our wage equation with a coefficient  γν − = − lmp b . If workers in 
labour market programs exert the same downward pressure on wages as openly unemployed 
workers blmp should be equal bu. We found that  blmp is positive for two countries, negative for 
two countries, and the panel estimate is zero. Thus we see no clear evidence that workers in 
labour market programs contribute to wage restraint.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Our theoretical model rationalizes an econometric wage equation with wage relative to scope 
as the dependent variable and unemployment, replacement ratio, and lagged wage relative to 
scope on the right hand side. Such an equation has a good fit and produces similar results for 
all the Nordic countries. In the long run, wages adjust to the scope, determined by foreign 
prices and productivity. Based on our theoretical model, we interpret this as evidence that 
bargaining (rent sharing) is important in wage determination.
53 
Blanchard & Katz (1999) noted a difference in wage setting between the US and 
several European countries. While a Phillips curve fits the US data quite well - and can be 
interpreted as a vertical long run wage-setting curve - there is evidence of a sloping wage 
                                                           
52 There is turnover in programs so a positive m may reflect either workers looking for jobs while they are in 
programs, or workers competing better for jobs when they leave them. 
53 This is consistent with survey evidence that the ability to pay is an important determinant of wages; see 
references in Manning (1993).   29
curve – a relation between the levels of wages and unemployment in European countries.
54 
Similarly, Bårdsen, Eitrheim, Jansen & Nymoen (2005, ch. 4.6) find that a Phillips curve fits 
Norwegian wage data quite poorly. Our model provides a straightforward explanation of such 
a difference. The wage-setting curve becomes vertical if one of the following conditions hold: 
i) workers have no bargaining power, or ii) the economy is completely closed. Both 
assumptions appear more relevant for the US than for a typical European country. 
According to our estimates, unemployment benefits play a significant role. In all 
four countries, benefit ratios increased around 1970. Initially, unemployment remained low, 
but the increase in benefits helps to explain high nominal wage increases in the mid 1970’s 
which eventually lead to rising unemployment. Of course, benefits may be correlated with 
other forms of labour market regulation which occurred at the same time, e. g. job security 
legislation which increased the protection of insiders. From this point of view, benefits may 
act as a proxy for labour market regulation generally. 
Our finding of pervasive nominal rigidity is contrary to the findings of e g 
Layard, Nickall & Jackman (1991, ch. 9) and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, ch. 8), who test 
for nominal rigidity by including the acceleration of inflation on the left hand side of a real 
wage equation.  If an increase in the inflation rate reduces the real wage, this is taken as 
evidence of nominal wage rigidity.  Applying this approach, they find large differences 
between countries, and for many countries there is no evidence of nominal wage rigidity.  
This test may be unreliable, however, because inflation is endogenous.  If a wage shock is 
quickly, but partially, passed on into prices, wage shocks will generate a positive correlation 
between real wage changes and inflation, and lead researchers to falsely conclude that there is 
little nominal wage rigidity.   
Our approach is similar but tests for nominal rigidity by examining how quickly 
wages respond to more exogenous variables. We found that nominal wages adjust very slowly 
after shocks to exchange rates and productivity in all four countries. Such a high degree of 
nominal wage rigidity may appear implausible. We should note, however, that union coverage 
is high, and union contracts have often been two or three years long. Also, a high degree of 
nominal wage rigidity is consistent with evidence from structural VAR models, which show 
very slow response of wages and prices to monetary shocks even in the US.
55   
High nominal wage rigidity means that changes in exchange rates have large 
and persistent effects on competitiveness. From other studies we know that competitiveness 
                                                           
54 See also Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) chapter 8. 
55 See e. g. Blanchard (1989), Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (1999).     30
has substantial effects on demand and production.
56  More generally, nominal wage rigidity 
means that demand management is important. Thus we confirm the views expressed by 
Lindbeck (1997), Rødseth (1997), Nymoen- Rødseth (2003), and Holmlund (2003) that 
demand side factors have been important determinants of unemployment in the medium term. 
It seems likely, for example, that expansionary fiscal and monetary policy in the 1970’s and 
1980’s delayed an increase in Swedish unemployment, which would have occurred if demand 
management had been less expansionary. 
Let us finally note that downward nominal wage rigidity, coordination of wage 
bargaining, and progressive taxes are potentially important factors, which have been omitted 
in the present study.
57 To incorporate these aspects in the model developed here is an 
interesting topic for future research.   
 
REFERENCES  
Agell, Jonas & Per Lundborg, 2003, Survey Evidence on Wage rigidity and Unemployment: Sweden 
in the 1990s, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105, 15-29. 
Aukrust, O., F. Holte, & G. Stoltz, 1967, Instilling II fra utredningsutvalget for inntektsoppgjörene 
1966, Oslo. 
Aukrust, Odd, 1977, “Inflation in the Open Economy: A Norwegian Model, in L. Krause and W. 
Salant (eds), Worldwide Inflation, Brookings Institution, Washington DC. 
Bårdsen, Gunnar, Öyvind Eitrheim, Eilev S. Jansen & Ragnar Nymoen, 2005, The Eocnometrics of 
Macroeconomic Modelling, Oxford University Press. 
Bean, Charles R., 1994, European Unemployment: A Survey, Journal of Economic Literature 32, 573-
619. 
Blanchard Olivier J., 1989, A Traditional Interpretation of Macroeconomic Fluctuations, American 
Economic Review 79, 1146-1164.  
Blanchard, Olivier J., 1991, Wage Bargaining and Unemployment Persistence, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 23, 277-292. 
Blanchard, Olivier & Lawrence F. Katz, 1999, Wage Dynamics: Reconciling Theory and Evidence, 
American Economic Review 89, Papers and Proceedings 69-74. 
Blanchflower, David & Andrew Oswald, 1994, The Wage Curve, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Cahuc, Pierre, and André Zylberberg, 2004, Labor Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge MA. 
                                                           
56 Gottfries (2002) documents large but sluggish effects of competitiveness on Swedish exports. 
57 These aspects have been analysed by e. g. Holden (1994, 2004), Agell & Lundborg (2003), Calmfors & 
Driffill (1988), Lockwood and Manning (1993), Holmlund & Kolm (1995).   31
Calmfors, Lars, 1979, Real Wages, Inflation and Unemployment in the Open Economy, in Assar 
Lindbeck (ed.) Inflation and Employment in Open Economies, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Calmfors, Lars, 1982, Employment Policies, Wage Formation, and Trade Union Behaviour in a Small 
Open Economy, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 84, 345-373. 
Calmfors, Lars, ed., 1990, Wage Formation in the Nordic Countries, Oxford University Press. 
Calmfors, Lars & Ragnar Nymoen, 1990, Real Wage Adjustment and Employment Policies in the 
Nordic Countries, Economic Policy 5, 397-448. 
Calmfors , Lars & Anders Forslund, 1991, Real Wage Determination and Labour Market Policies: the 
Swedish Experience, Economic Journal 101, 1130-1148. 
Calmfors, Lars and John Driffill, 1988, Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic 
Performance, Economic Policy 6. 
Carling, Kenneth, Holmlund, Bertil, & Altin Vejsiu, 2001, Do Benefit Cuts Boost Job Finding? 
Swedish Evidence from the 1990s, Economic Journal 111, 766-790. 
Carlsson, Mikael, 2003, Measures of Technology and the Short-run Response to Technology Shocks, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105, 555-579. 
Christiano, Lawrence J., Eichenbaum, Martin, & Evans, Charles L., 1999, Monetary policy shocks: 
What have we learned and to what end? In M. Woodford & J. B. Taylor, editors, Handbook of 
Macroeconomics, Elsevier Science North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Edgren, Gösta, Karl-Olof Faxén & Carl-Erik Odhner, 1970, Lönbebildning och Samhällsekonomi 
(Wage Formation and the Economy, in Swedish), Rabén & Sjögren, Stockholm. 
Edin, Per-Anders & Anders Vredin, 1993, Devaluation Risk in Target Zones – Evidence from the 
Nordic Countries, Economic Journal 103, 161-175. 
Eriksson, Stefan, 2001, Skill Loss, Ranking of Job Applicants, and the Dynamics of Unemployment, 
Institute for Labour market Policy Evaluation working paper 2001:4, forthcoming in the 
German Economic Review. 
Eriksson, Stefan, 2002, Imperfect Information, Wage Formation, and the Employability of the 
Unemployed, Institute for Labour market Policy Evaluation working paper 2002:17. 
Eriksson, Stefan, & Nils Gottfries, 2005, Ranking of Job Applicants, On-the-job Search and Persistent 
Unemployment, Labour Economics 12, 407-428.  
Evjen, S. & T. Langseth, 1997, Arbeidsledighet og tiltak i Norden. Dokumentasion av nordiske 
makrodata, working paper 4/97, Foundation for Research in Economics and Business 
Administration, Oslo. 
Forslund, Anders, 1997, “Lönebildningen och arbetsmarknadens funktionssätt” (Wage formation and 
the functioning of the labour market, in Swedish), Appendix 1 to SOU 1997:4, Ministry of 
Labour, Stockholm.   32
Forslund, Anders, & Ann-Sofie Kolm, 2004, Active labour market policies and real-wage 
determination - Swedish Evidence, in S. Polachek (ed): Accounting for Worker Well-Being - 
Research in Labor Economics vol 23. 
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou & Michael M. Knetter, 1997, Goods Prices and Exchange Rates: What 
Have we Learned?, Journal of Economic Literature 35, 1243-1272. 
Gottfries, Nils, 1992, Insiders, Outsiders, and Nominal Wage Contracts, Journal of Political Economy 
100, 252-270.  
- “ - , 2002, Market Shares, Finance Constraints, and Pricing Behaviour in the Export Industry, 
Economica 69, 583-607. 
Gottfries, N. & T. Persson, 1988, Empirical examinations of the information sets of economic agents, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 251-259.  
Gottfries, Nils, & Andreas Westermark, 1998, Nominal Wage Contracts and the Persistent Effects of 
Monetary Policy, European Economic Review, 42 (207-223. 
Hersoug, T, Knut Kjaer & Asbjorn Rodseth, 1986, Wages, Taxes and the Utility-Maximizing Trade 
Union – a Confrontation with Norwegian data, Oxford Economic Papers 38, 403-423. 
Holden, Steinar, 1990, Wage Bargaining and Efficiency Wages: Some Implications for Tests of Trade 
Union Models, in  Wage Bargaining: Theory and Some Norwegian Evidence, PhD Thesis, Oslo 
University. 
Holden, Steinar, 1994, Wage Bargaining and Nominal Wage Rigidities, European Economic Review 
38, 1021-1039. 
Holden, Steinar, 2004, The Cost of Price Stability: Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in Europe, 
Economica 71, 183-208. 
Holden, Steinar, & Ragnar Nymoen, 2002, Measuring structural unemployment: NAWRU-estimates 
in the Nordic countries, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104, 87-104.  
Holm, P., Honkapohja, Seppo. & Erkki Koskela, 1994, A Monopoly Union model of Wage 
Determination with Capital and Taxes - an Application to Finnish Manufacturing, European 
Economic Review 38, 285-303. 
Holmlund, Bertil, 1998, Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice, Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, 100, 113-141. 
Holmlund, Bertil, The Rise and Fall of Swedish Unemployment, Working Paper 2003:13, Department 
of Economics, Uppsala University. 
Holmlund, Bertil & Ann-Sofie Kolm, 1995, Progressive Taxation, Wage Setting, and Unemployment: 
Theory and Swedish Evidence, Swedish Economic Policy Review 2, 423-460. 
Horn, Henrik & Torsten Persson, 1988, Exchange Rate Policy, Wage formation and Credibility, 
European Economic Review 32, 1621-1636. 
Jacobsson, Lars & Assar Lindbeck, 1971, On the Transmission of Wage Change, Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics  273-293.   33
Johansen, Kåre, 1995, Norwegian wage curves, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 57, 229-
247. 
Layard, Richard & Stephen Nickell, 1986, Unemployment in Britain, Economica 53 (special issue), 
121-166. 
Layard, Richard, Stephen Nickell, & Richard Jackman, 1991, Unemployment - Macroeconomic 
Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Lindbeck, Assar, 1979, Imported and Structural Inflation and Aggregate Demand – the Scandinavian 
Model, in Assar Lindbeck (ed.), Inflation and Employment in Open Economies, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
Lindbeck, Assar, 1997, The Swedish Experiment, Journal of Economic Literature 35, 1273-1319 . 
Lockwood, Ben and Alan Manning, 1993, Wage Setting and the Tax System – Theory and Evidence 
for the United Kingdom, Journal of Puiblic Economics 52, 1-29. 
Manning, Alan, 1993, Wage Bargaining and the Phillips Curve: Identification and Specification of 
Aggregate Wage Equations, Economic Journal 103, 98-118. 
Mankiw, N. G. & Reis, R., 2002, Sticky information versus sticky prices: A proposal to replace the 
New Keynesian Phillips curve. Quarterly Journal of Economics,  117, 1295–1328. 
Nymoen, Ragnar, 1989, Modelling Wages in the Small Open Economy: an Error-Correction model of 
Norwegian Manufacturing Wages, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 51, 239-258. 
Nymoen, Ragnar & Asbjørn Rødseth, 2003, Explaining Unemployment: Some Lessons from Nordic 
Wage Formation, Labour Economics 10, 1-29. 
Nickell, Stephen and Richard Layard, 1999, Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance, 
Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 3029-3084. 
Oswald, Andrew J., 1985, The Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An Introductory Survey, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 87, 160-193. 
Ozkan, G. & A. Sutherland, 1998, A Currency Crisis Model with an Optimizing Policymaker, Journal 
of International Economics 44, 339-364. 
Rødseth, Asbjørn, 1997, Why has Unemployment been so Low in Norway?  On the Potential of 
Macroeconomic Implications, in Dölvik, J. E., A. H. Steen, eds., Making Solidarity Work?, 
Scandinavian University Press, Oslo. 
Rødseth, Asbjørn & Steinar Holden, 1990, Wage Formation in Norway, in Lars Calmfors (ed.): Wage 
Formation and Macroeconomic Policy in the Nordic Countries, Oxford University Press. 
Stock, James. H. & Mark W. Watson, 1988, Variable Trends in economic Time Series, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 2, 147-174. 
Appendix 1. Additional Derivations 
 
A standard model of union bargaining.   34
With perfect competition in goods and capital markets, constant returns to scale, and labour-
augmenting technical progress Zi, we have maximzed profit in firm i: 
  () ( ) () i i i i i i i i
i N i K i RK N W N Z N Z K Pf Z W − − = Π / max ,
,
. 
Let k be capital per effective worker:  ( ) ZN K k / ≡ . Profit maximization implies that k is determined 
by  () P R k f / ' =  and the labour share of income is  ( ) ( ) k f k k f LS / ' 1− = . If R/P is determined in 
the world market the labour share is independent of wage setting. Let the wage  i W  be determined by 
Nash bargaining: 
() () ()
β β − Π −





where U is the utility function of the worker,  
c P  is the consumer price, and β  represents the 
bargaining power of the workers. The “threat point” of the worker is taken to be the expected utility if 
you leave the firm without a job: 
  () () ( ) ( ) ( )
c c a P B U u P W U u U / / 1 ρ ρ + − =  
where W is the wage prevailing elsewhere, B is unemployment benefit, and  ( ) u ρ  is the risk of 
remaining unemployed, taken to be an increasing function of unemployment, u. Maximizing and 
considering a symmetric equilibrium where  W Wi = , we get 
  ()
() () ( ) () ()
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P B U P W U u












In the derivation we use the fact that the derivative of the profit function with respect to the wage 
equals minus employment. In the case of constant relative risk aversion 





− c c P W P W U  the solution for the wage is 

























where σ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The wage is proportional to the unemployment 
benefit with a “mark up” that depends on the state of the labour market.  If we allow for monopolistic 
competition with constant-elastic demand this will not change the qualitative conclusion. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1   35
Note first that equations (7) and (8) imply 
e f w W W W ≥ > .
58  Assume now that 
e f W W > .
59  To 
find the effect of Θon the wage we differentiate (9): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () Θ Π − − Θ Π



















To simplify notation we have set  1 = W  and left out A. As 
f w W W >  the denominator is negative, 
provided the second order condition is fulfilled. Thus the sign of the numerator determines the sign. 





























































w W is larger than 
f W and 
e W , this holds if  ( ) ( ) W W Π Θ ΠΘ /  is an increasing function of the 
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where  () P P E i /  is the elasticity of the demand equation and  ) ( i W Ψ  is the optimal relative price as a 
function of the wage, holding other variables constant. It is straightforward to show that Ψ  is an 
increasing function. End of proof. 
 
Labour turnover and the chance to get a job 
Assume that workers have log utility functions. In a short period of length Δ an unemployed workers 
can search or not search and the period-specific cost associated with search is ζ  which is drawn from 
a distribution  () ζ H . Let ν  be an index for whether the worker is searching. The value of 
unemployment is given by  
{} () () [ ] ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ Δ − Δ − + Δ
Δ +
+ − Δ =
∈ ζ ν ν ν
ν
u j u V A AV
r






                                                           
58 To show this, consider first the case when  ( ) ( ) e W e W w W f W > + − = φ φ δ 1 . Since  1 < δ , this immediately 
implies that  f W w W >  and hence  e W f W w W > > . If, instead  ( ) ( ) e W w W e W f W φ φ δ + − > = 1  equation 
(7) implies that that  e W w W >  since profits fall when the wage increases. 
59 For the case when  e W f W =  the argument is analogous.   36
V
j is the value of a job which is given by 
  () () [ ]
u j j sV V s
r
p w V Δ + Δ −
Δ +




An unemployed worker will search if  ( ) ( ) r V V A
u j Δ + − ≤ 1 / ζ . Letting the period length Δgo to 
zero we get  ( )( ) A s r b w V V
U j + + − = − /  and hence the fraction of unemployed workers searching 
at a particular point in time is  () ( ) () A s r b w A H + + − / . The probability to get a job, A, is given by 
the flow of job openings divided by the number of workers looking for jobs. Job openings occur 
because of quits and turnover between jobs and job applicants consist of unemployed workers and 
those searching on the job: 
( )





+ + + − −
+
=   
where L is the labour force and N is employment. This can be rewritten as 
() ( ) ()
U
U
s A s r b w A AH
−
= + + −
1
/  
where U=(L-N)/L. This equation determines the chance to get a job implicitly as a function of the 
replacement rate and unemployment. 
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